The War In Afghanistan: How To End It
Compton Lecture, Massachusetts Institute Of Technology
March 10th, 2010
It is a great honour to be delivering the Compton Lecture today. As a student here in the late 1980s I learnt much; about political science, my chosen subject, but also about the history of this great institution - a beacon both of academic excellence and of the enlightenment values of progress, discovery and belief in human worth, which we cherish so dearly on both sides of the Atlantic. I remember the twelve months I spent here extremely fondly.
In 1988, I would never have believed that twenty years later I would be British Foreign Secretary explaining a war in Afghanistan. But I have chosen this as the topic for my lecture today for some simple but important reasons: - First, our national security. Terrorism is the number one national security threat to the UK, and the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan are our greatest concern; not because their governments chose this but because the security deficit allows terrorist groups of international potency to prosper.
- Second, the transatlantic alliance. I came to MIT in 1988 on a programme, the Kennedy Scholarships, dedicated to the memory of your fallen President. Its rationale was to strengthen the Transatlantic Alliance; and NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is that Alliance’s greatest test.
- Third, the future of western power. We are moving into a multi-polar age, where the spread of economic power from west to east will demand a change in the international balance of political power. The fate of Afghanistan will have vital implications for the coalitions we need to build with Muslim majority countries far beyond South Asia.
There is also another reason for devoting this speech to Afghanistan. We did not start the war in Afghanistan. In the 1990s that country’s Taliban government provided cover and support for Al Qaeda’s senior leadership. It was a symbiotic relationship: in return Osama Bin Laden supported the Taliban with money and fighters. After Afghanistan was used as the launching pad for the terrible events of 9/11, the UN mission, and later the NATO mission, enjoyed widespread international support. But we never meant our military to be there forever. Eight years in, with Al Qaeda having been pushed into Pakistan, it is not enough to explain to people why the war started. We need to set out how it will be ended – preserving what has been achieved and protecting South Asia from a contagion that would affect us all.
The military surge now underway is vital to success in Afghanistan. Civilian and economic investment is a necessity in a country that comes second to bottom of the UN’s Human Development Report. These are preconditions for progress. My argument today is that now is the time for the Afghans to pursue a political settlement with as much vigour and energy as we are pursuing the military and civilian effort. The political settlement needs to be external as well as internal, involving all of Afghanistan’s neighbours as well as those parts of the insurgency willing permanently to sever ties with Al Qaeda, to give up their armed struggle, and live within the Afghan constitutional framework.
There are no superlatives to do justice to the bravery of the American, British and other soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines fighting in Afghanistan. Their professionalism in the face of great adversity; the enthusiasm with which they talk of a better future for a land thousands of miles from their own. But in my experience these young men and women are the first to acknowledge that however hard they try, their work alone will not be enough to secure Afghanistan.
As President Obama put it, “we are not going to succeed simply by piling on more and more troops”. Or as Prime Minister Gordon Brown has said, we need “not just a military push… but a political push". And as General McChrystal has himself acknowledged “a political solution to all conflicts is the inevitable outcome”.
So while violence of the most murderous, indiscriminate and terrible kind started this Afghan war, politics will bring it to an end on the back of concerted military and civilian effect.
History
For millennia, Afghanistan’s history has been in large part its geography: at the cross-roads of South West Asia, astride the mountain ranges and deserts that separate the sub-continent from Central Asia. From Alexander the Great to Genghis Khan, from General Roberts –who marched 10,000 British and Indian troops from Kabul to relieve Kandahar during the second Anglo-Afghan war - to General Gromov, the last Soviet soldier to withdraw across the Oxus river in the dying days of the USSR, commanders and their armies have crossed and re-crossed the high passes and wide rivers that bind this ancient land.
Britain fought three wars in Afghanistan between 1840 and 1920. Each time it was defending its power base – and equities – in British India. Each time it suffered military reverses as it sought to establish order. Yet, on every occasion, once that lesson had been learnt, the hard and bloody way, the imperial strategists sought – and secured - a saner and more sustainable objective: a self-governing, self-policing, but heavily subsidised Afghanistan, where the tribes balanced each other and the Afghan state posed no threat to the safety of British India.
Soviet strategists reached strikingly similar conclusions. When in 1989 the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan withdrew back across the Oxus, they left behind a government which survived for three years. It did so by – in the words of the advice from the Kremlin – “forgetting Communism, abandoning socialism, embracing Islam, and working with the tribes”. As with every other regime in modern Afghan history, the Najibullah government could not have existed without external subsidy. And so it fell when Yeltsin’s newly independent Russia cut all aid to Kabul.
Britain’s experience in the 19th century, and the Soviet Union’s in the 20th, showed that the best way, perhaps the only way, to stabilise Afghanistan in the long term is to empower the Afghans themselves to secure and govern their own villages and valleys. To realise this, the Afghans need full political and military support, and generous subsidy, from outside. But the Afghan people neither need nor welcome our combat troops on their soil any longer than is necessary to guarantee security and set them on a course to regulating their own affairs.
A recent study of Britain’s bloody withdrawal from Kabul in 1842 concluded that the first cause of the disaster had been the reluctance of junior officers to tell their superiors the truth about the dire situation the British forces found themselves in. I know from my own discussions with diplomats and Commanders in the field that such “happy talk” is not the order of the day now. Getting Afghanistan right means getting right down to ground truth. These are the facts as I see them.
- The Afghan people are tired of 30 years of war. They have been traumatised by the fighting and the denial of basic rights and opportunities. The majority of them hate, for good reason, the brutality of the Taliban.
- The Afghan government faces competing demands from its own people, and from the international community. But it lacks capacity. The concerns run deeper than elections marred by corruption. They also relate to the very structure of the political system.
- The Afghan insurgency is a broad but shallow coalition, with shifting relationships, geographical bases, and tactics. The Taliban are led by members of the former Talib regime under Mullah Omar who is now based in Pakistan’s border areas. But a variety of other factions are also operating, including the Haqqani network, Hizb-e Islami and a range of smaller groups. These groups all trade on the uncertainties of the people and the weaknesses of the state.
- The Taliban are still despised - recent polling suggests that only 6% want them back in power. But they do now have organised cadres which enjoy some, limited support - in the South, East and North – and are able to mount operations in Kabul and elsewhere.
- Having fled Afghanistan, Al Qaeda’s senior leadership is now also hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Its leaders have, in significant number, been killed or arrested. Despite the historical ties between Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban their relationship is predominantly tactical and local. Yet Al Qaeda retains the global capacity – including through its affiliates, such as that in Yemen - to plan and carry out deadly attacks.
- There has been a significant change in Pakistan in the last 18 months under President Zardari’s civilian government. The reality and threat of domestic terrorism has brought new purpose to civilian and military leadership, and new consensus between leaders and led. It is now realistic to talk of complementary pressure on the insurgencies on both sides of the border.
The Afghan and international strategy over the last eight years has been focused on building up key pillars of the state and delivering better lives for the Afghan people. There is a real record of achievement here, continuing today.
The return of five million refugees in recent years is perhaps the greatest sign of the growing Afghan confidence in their own safety and security, and an important indicator of our own progress in protecting the population. Polling shows however that insecurity is still the biggest problem. Last year more Afghan civilians were killed by the Taliban in insurgent attacks than ever before.
In 2003 the Afghan National Army numbered fewer than 2,000. Today it is over 100,000 strong, though the ethnic balance within it is weak. It will grow a third by the end of December, and further in the years to come. The Afghan soldiers are gaining frontline combat experience, including in the Moshtarak operation in Helmand Province. Plans are now being developed for the Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility to the Afghans – district by district and province by province – as the key conditions are met, starting this year. And as the Afghan National Army gets stronger, international forces will be able to withdraw from a combat role – although their support training and mentoring their Afghan counterparts will need to continue for a number of years.
In education and health the figures speak for themselves. In 2001, only one million Afghan children attended school, all of them boys. This year we expect to see seven million Afghan children in school– a third of them girls. Eight out of 10 Afghans now have access to healthcare. This year 40,000 more Afghan children will see their fifth birthdays than would have in 2002.
The National Solidarity Programme would be a remarkable story in any country. Almost 30,000 village councils have been elected by their peers. They have not just designed but implemented 40,000 development projects, and are now forming, from the bottom up, district councils.
There are areas where it is much harder to talk of progress, and where we are now rightly stepping up our efforts and where the Afghan government needs to do much more.
- Justice and law and order are a critical battleground. The Afghan National Police number almost 100,000. The biggest problem is now quality not quantity as the force is riven with drugs, illiteracy, patronage and corruption. The Afghan government is, rightly, launching a robust and far-reaching programme of reform. But they also need, with our help, to build up the informal judicial structures for criminal and civil dispute resolution. That is, after all, what Afghans often mean by the rule of law.
- Despite the success of the National Solidarity Programme, civil administration is a massively uphill struggle. In large parts of the country, district governance is almost non-existent; half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. Over the next two years the international community has promised to help train 12,000 sub-national civil servants.
- Last but not least, corruption. 95% of Afghans see corruption as a problem in their local area and in some regions the average Afghan is paying $100 in bribes every year. Such widespread abuse has deep roots. President Karzai has promised to take steps to end the culture of impunity, including by strengthening the High Office of Oversight to investigate and sanction corrupt officials. The international community will judge him by his actions not his words. Donors are trying to incentivise action here by promising to channel more aid through the government as certain tests are met.
The achievements of the last eight years are real. And none of them would have been possible were it not for the tireless efforts and unstinting bravery of our military. Without them, the insurgency would have overwhelmed the Afghan government and probably overrun Kabul. Our development work would have ground to a halt. And Al Qaeda would have seized more space to plan their terrorist atrocities.
The work ahead – on each of these fronts – is both clear and it is pressing. The additional troops that your country and mine are deploying are vital if progress is to be made. Britain’s commitment and determination will endure until we have achieved our shared goal – an Afghanistan that will not again be used as a base for international terrorism.
However, even on the most optimistic reading of present plans, only if the scale of the insurgency itself is reduced will the Afghan authorities be able to govern their land in sustainable or acceptable ways. And only then will we be able to withdraw our forces confident that we will not have to return. The efforts of our militaries are an important part of this. As General McChrystal said recently the role of the military is to “try to shape conditions which allow people to come to a truly equitable solution to how the Afghan people are governed”. This raises the core political challenge for Afghanistan, one which has been neglected for far too long.
The Bonn Agreement of 2001 and the process which followed it fell short of a sustainable political settlement. The Northern Alliance came to Bonn as the new masters of Afghanistan. But they were not representative of the broader Afghan population. It was right that the Taliban leaders were excluded from Bonn. But other, more significant and legitimate groups were seriously under represented, most notably the various Pashtun confederations from which the Taliban draws its strength.
The two Jirgas which followed Bonn led to a top down, highly centralised political structure for a country where the people have always had a strong predilection for managing their own affairs at local level.
Furthermore, the balance of formal and informal democratic institutions did not mesh with tribal and other informal, traditional and community-based structures. Corruption has exacerbated these problems. Resentment towards corrupt officials has eroded confidence in public office.
Finally, from Iran in the west to Pakistan in the east, the Central Asian Republics in the North, and the regional powers of India, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Turkey, the Bonn Agreement failed to bind the neighbours into the long-term project of building a new, more peaceful Afghanistan.
The lesson I draw from history is that Afghanistan will never achieve a sustainable peace unless many more Afghans are inside the political system, and the neighbours are onside with the political settlement.
Political Outreach
In respect of the insurgency, there is now international consensus behind a programme of reintegration, which the UN defines as “the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income”.
The logic behind this programme is simple. As military pressure on the insurgency increases - as the dangers of continuing the fight grow and the prospects of success look more remote – those on the periphery of the insurgency will start to review their allegiances. We have seen this across Helmand in recent months. Already in Marjah, the site of General McChrystal’s first big push to establish order, some fighters have agreed to lay down their weapons and accept the writ of the government.
For such realignments to be sustained there needs to be a serious alternative future for insurgents – not just employment but protection from retaliation by former allies. That is the significance of President Karzai’s proposed National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration, and of the $150m the international community has already pledged to fund it.
But my case today is that a reintegration programme will have major impact only if it is coupled with a serious effort to address the grievances of those whom President Karzai describes as his “disaffected compatriots”. Without a genuine effort to understand and ultimately address the wider concerns which fuel the insurgency, it will be hard to convince significant numbers of combatants that their interests will be better served by working with the government than by fighting against it.
Some insurgents are committed to Al Qaida’s violent extremist agenda. There will never be reconciliation with them – they must be beaten back. But the majority are not. They share conservative Islamic beliefs and, linked to that, strong views about what is a just social order. Their rallying cry is the expulsion of international forces. But they are also motivated by their intense dissatisfaction with the Afghan Government and Afghan politics – which they see as corrupt and incompetent.
The idea of political engagement with those who would directly or indirectly attack our troops is difficult. We have no more right to betray our own values than those of the Afghan people who pray that the Taliban never come back. But dialogue is not appeasement and political space is not the same as veto power or domination.
The Afghans must own, lead and drive such political engagement. It will be a slow, gradual process. But the insurgents will want to see international support. International engagement, for example under the auspices of the UN, may ultimately be required. So there needs to be clarity about the preconditions for any agreement: those who want a political say in their country’s future must permanently sever ties with Al Qaeda, give up their armed struggle, and accept the Afghan constitutional framework. In doing so their interests would be recognised and given a political voice but constrained by the laws of the land and balanced by the interests and views of others.
In his repeated offers to talk direct to insurgents, President Karzai has made clear that, whilst preconditions should set the terms of any eventual agreement, they should not prevent a dialogue from developing. The military build up of international and Afghan capacity concentrates the mind. Dialogue provides an alternative to fight or flight.
What might such a political settlement look like? An outsider can offer only suggestions. But the elements of a new political framework could include:
First, arrangements, formal or informal, to ensure that the legitimate tribal, ethnic and other groups that feel excluded from the post-Bonn political settlement, are given a real stake in the political process, and the ability to compete for political representation. A peace settlement must include the vanquished as well as the victors.
New arrangements for political organisation should give voice to the different blocs of opinion and influence. And efforts should be made to broaden the ethnic base of the Afghan National Army and other key institutions. All of this would encourage individuals to address their grievances, and those of their broader community, from within the system. The threat to the insurgency is of growing military pressure from increasingly numerous and capable Afghan and international forces. The offer is a political voice commensurate with support in the population and consistent with the Afghan constitution.
Second, the empowerment of provincial and district governors and their associated assemblies of elders, so that the walis (or provincial governors) and the uluswals (district governors) have the confidence, competence and capacity with which to govern in the best interests of those they represent. Recruiting the right people into these jobs is essential – and given the challenges in upholding justice and the rule of law the police chief and local magistrates are equally important. Local governors and local assemblies also need to be given more operational responsibility for development, dispute resolution, local security and local reintegration.
Third, a new dispensation – not necessarily involving constitutional change - between President and parliament, in which the legislature feels that it too has a real stake in the success of the enterprise. A stake that would encourage parliamentarians to construct as well as to criticise. And which would ultimately lead to the development of something completely alien in Afghanistan today, but critical to democracy – a constructive or loyal opposition.
And fourth, underpinning all this, must be a more concerted effort to prevent corruption. President Karzai’s promise to tackle the culture of impunity, and the establishment of a new anti- corruption unit are important. But the new political settlement needs to include many more checks and balances, and much greater emphasis on transparency and accountability to ensure that government at all levels and in all guises is the servant not the master of the Afghan people.
The great consultation proposed by President Karzai - the grand peace jirga – on 29 April should be the start of a process of building a new national political framework. The President has now spoken several times about his hopes for this gathering, which needs to be well prepared and bring together diverse representatives from across Afghanistan. It cannot solve every problem. It can set out the principles on which they will be addressed. We should support careful preparation, wide engagement and systematic follow-up, and encourage the President to play a leading role.
The External Political Settlement
A new internal political consensus would go a long way towards securing Afghanistan’s future stability. But no country’s politics can exist in a vacuum, least of all Afghanistan’s. For too long it has been the victim of external meddling and interference.
In 1898, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India called Afghanistan, “a piece on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for domination of the world”. The ‘Great Game’ and the Cold War are of course history. But even today, Afghanistan is a theatre in which competing regional interests are being pursued. And its tribal and ethnic groups – in the south, the east and the north – still roam freely across its borders. Those who oppose the government still draw on external funding, support and shelter.
So, if Afghanistan is to have a more peaceful and prosperous future, it needs not just a new internal political settlement but also a new external political settlement. There needs to be a greater effort to reach out not just to disaffected Afghans, but to the country’s neighbours and near neighbours.
Given the scale of the geopolitical challenges in this region – including the long-running tensions between India and Pakistan and the position of Iran – it can seem that Afghanistan is fated to remain the victim of a zero-sum scramble for power amongst hostile neighbours. The logic of this position is that Afghanistan will never achieve peace until the region’s most intractable problems are solved.
But there is an alternative, more promising story, in which Afghanistan is so dangerous for the region that it becomes the place where more cooperative regional relations are forged.
The first step is a greater recognition by all Afghanistan’s neighbours and the key regional powers of two simple facts. Fact one: no country in the region, let alone the international community, will again allow Afghanistan to be dominated, or used as a strategic asset, by a neighbouring state. Fact two: that the status quo in Afghanistan is damaging to all. Crime, drugs, terrorism, refugees spill across its borders when Afghanistan’s great mineral wealth and agricultural potential should be feeding the region. These two facts can and must provide the basis of a shared interest around which the countries of the region can coalesce.
Second – and this point is more complex - there needs to be a more honest acknowledgement of the different interests and concerns of the neighbours, so that efforts can be made to provide reassurances.
Pakistan is essential here. It holds many of the keys to security and dialogue. It clearly has to be a partner in finding solutions in Afghanistan.
Of course, Pakistan will only act according to its own sense of its national interest. That is only natural. Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan is close to the core of its national security interests. Pakistan fears the build up of a non-Pashtun Afghan National Army on their doorstep. It is perpetually worried about India’s relationship with Afghanistan.
Pakistan is a country of about 170 million people and growing fast. Its own security and economy has been directly damaged by decades of insecurity in Afghanistan. It is a nuclear power. It has had a difficult relationship with the US for a generation. That is the significance of the US Government’s determination to pursue a new security, economic and political relationship. This is a vital opportunity to address Pakistan’s concerns – and ours. The Kerry-Lugar Act is an important down payment in this regard.
But progress cannot be achieved simply by a more serious, more equal US-Pakistan strategic security understanding, crucial though that is.
If we are to recreate the post 9/11 regional consensus, there must be enough transparency to build confidence that every country’s legitimate interests will be respected, but that none will be privileged.
That means that alongside Pakistan’s own fears about its western border, fears about Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan need to be addressed. Every country needs to accept that, just as there will be no settlement in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s involvement, so there will no settlement in Afghanistan unless India, Russia, Turkey and China are also involved in the search for solutions. China is Afghanistan’s largest foreign investor and I will discuss the regional approach in Beijing next week. India has already pledged $1.2bn for reconstruction in Afghanistan. It has a big role to play. It means that the Iranian regime – which is flouting the UN on the nuclear file and has a track record in attempting to destabilise its neighbours – must acknowledge that the best way to protect its investments or promote the interests of Afghans that share its Shia faith is to work to promote peace not undermine it. Spurning the invitation to the London Conference was completely short-sighted.
Third, I warmly welcome the focus of Ambassador Holbrooke on agriculture and the success of wheat seed distribution programmes in turning farmers from poppy to licit production. Economics should also be the great lubricant for better regional relations. Afghanistan can benefit all its neighbours if it becomes the land bridge of Central Asia, South Asia and the Gulf. After all, the Silk Road was the passage for trade for many centuries. There are common interests not just in trade and transport, but in managing and sharing water and electricity and harnessing economic growth for the benefit of the region.
Fourth is the question of the forum in which this work should be taken forward. The process must be regionally owned. The Turkish Government’s meeting in Istanbul in January launched a new drive. The London Conference gave wider international approval. The Afghan government now needs to take the lead on regional engagement, in partnership with the UN. Only the region can decide whether the multitude of existing regional bodies can provide the basis for the serious and sustained engagement that is now needed; if not then a new standing Conference on Stability, Security and Cooperation in South Asia may be the answer.
Finally, and this is where the external settlement links most clearly to the internal political settlement, there needs to be greater transparency with respect to the future direction of Afghan foreign policy. It is for the Afghans to decide how to do this, but they too have a critical role to play in building confidence and reducing miscalculation. Linked to this, there will need to be consistency and clarity about the presence, activities and future plans of the international forces in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
I have been to Afghanistan six times as British Foreign Secretary. On my first visit in July 2007 I attended the funeral of its last king, Mohammed Zahir Shah. The grief I witnessed was palpable and deep, but so too was the sense of national unity. The unity is not expressed today through allegiance to a Monarch. Instead it is founded on a deep desire of the people to live life as they see fit. In that they are their country’s greatest resource – and ours.
The end state that we are striving for in Afghanistan is not utopian. Far from it. But within two to five years it is realistic to aspire to see a country on an upward trajectory, still poor but with a just peace, with democracy and inclusive politics bedding down at all levels and with incomes growing. The urban population should have access to electricity 24/7. More shops will be open in the local bazaars and more children - and in particular more girls - will be going to schools. Most grass roots insurgents –the so called ten dollar a day Taliban - should be resettled in their villages with at least some of the insurgent leaders reconciling into the legitimate political process. Communities will be increasingly able to rely on the Afghan National Security Forces for protection – or to protect themselves. International troops will have stepped back from the frontline to focus on the still dangerous work of training and mentoring. The neighbours will be working together, preventing trouble not fuelling it. And above all, Al Qaeda will be kept out.
This vision depends on sacrifice and money. But it is only feasible if politics comes to the fore. This is how the war in Afghanistan will be brought to an end.
Compton Lecture, Massachusetts Institute Of Technology
March 10th, 2010
It is a great honour to be delivering the Compton Lecture today. As a student here in the late 1980s I learnt much; about political science, my chosen subject, but also about the history of this great institution - a beacon both of academic excellence and of the enlightenment values of progress, discovery and belief in human worth, which we cherish so dearly on both sides of the Atlantic. I remember the twelve months I spent here extremely fondly.
In 1988, I would never have believed that twenty years later I would be British Foreign Secretary explaining a war in Afghanistan. But I have chosen this as the topic for my lecture today for some simple but important reasons: - First, our national security. Terrorism is the number one national security threat to the UK, and the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan are our greatest concern; not because their governments chose this but because the security deficit allows terrorist groups of international potency to prosper.
- Second, the transatlantic alliance. I came to MIT in 1988 on a programme, the Kennedy Scholarships, dedicated to the memory of your fallen President. Its rationale was to strengthen the Transatlantic Alliance; and NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is that Alliance’s greatest test.
- Third, the future of western power. We are moving into a multi-polar age, where the spread of economic power from west to east will demand a change in the international balance of political power. The fate of Afghanistan will have vital implications for the coalitions we need to build with Muslim majority countries far beyond South Asia.
There is also another reason for devoting this speech to Afghanistan. We did not start the war in Afghanistan. In the 1990s that country’s Taliban government provided cover and support for Al Qaeda’s senior leadership. It was a symbiotic relationship: in return Osama Bin Laden supported the Taliban with money and fighters. After Afghanistan was used as the launching pad for the terrible events of 9/11, the UN mission, and later the NATO mission, enjoyed widespread international support. But we never meant our military to be there forever. Eight years in, with Al Qaeda having been pushed into Pakistan, it is not enough to explain to people why the war started. We need to set out how it will be ended – preserving what has been achieved and protecting South Asia from a contagion that would affect us all.
The military surge now underway is vital to success in Afghanistan. Civilian and economic investment is a necessity in a country that comes second to bottom of the UN’s Human Development Report. These are preconditions for progress. My argument today is that now is the time for the Afghans to pursue a political settlement with as much vigour and energy as we are pursuing the military and civilian effort. The political settlement needs to be external as well as internal, involving all of Afghanistan’s neighbours as well as those parts of the insurgency willing permanently to sever ties with Al Qaeda, to give up their armed struggle, and live within the Afghan constitutional framework.
There are no superlatives to do justice to the bravery of the American, British and other soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines fighting in Afghanistan. Their professionalism in the face of great adversity; the enthusiasm with which they talk of a better future for a land thousands of miles from their own. But in my experience these young men and women are the first to acknowledge that however hard they try, their work alone will not be enough to secure Afghanistan.
As President Obama put it, “we are not going to succeed simply by piling on more and more troops”. Or as Prime Minister Gordon Brown has said, we need “not just a military push… but a political push". And as General McChrystal has himself acknowledged “a political solution to all conflicts is the inevitable outcome”.
So while violence of the most murderous, indiscriminate and terrible kind started this Afghan war, politics will bring it to an end on the back of concerted military and civilian effect.
History
For millennia, Afghanistan’s history has been in large part its geography: at the cross-roads of South West Asia, astride the mountain ranges and deserts that separate the sub-continent from Central Asia. From Alexander the Great to Genghis Khan, from General Roberts –who marched 10,000 British and Indian troops from Kabul to relieve Kandahar during the second Anglo-Afghan war - to General Gromov, the last Soviet soldier to withdraw across the Oxus river in the dying days of the USSR, commanders and their armies have crossed and re-crossed the high passes and wide rivers that bind this ancient land.
Britain fought three wars in Afghanistan between 1840 and 1920. Each time it was defending its power base – and equities – in British India. Each time it suffered military reverses as it sought to establish order. Yet, on every occasion, once that lesson had been learnt, the hard and bloody way, the imperial strategists sought – and secured - a saner and more sustainable objective: a self-governing, self-policing, but heavily subsidised Afghanistan, where the tribes balanced each other and the Afghan state posed no threat to the safety of British India.
Soviet strategists reached strikingly similar conclusions. When in 1989 the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan withdrew back across the Oxus, they left behind a government which survived for three years. It did so by – in the words of the advice from the Kremlin – “forgetting Communism, abandoning socialism, embracing Islam, and working with the tribes”. As with every other regime in modern Afghan history, the Najibullah government could not have existed without external subsidy. And so it fell when Yeltsin’s newly independent Russia cut all aid to Kabul.
Britain’s experience in the 19th century, and the Soviet Union’s in the 20th, showed that the best way, perhaps the only way, to stabilise Afghanistan in the long term is to empower the Afghans themselves to secure and govern their own villages and valleys. To realise this, the Afghans need full political and military support, and generous subsidy, from outside. But the Afghan people neither need nor welcome our combat troops on their soil any longer than is necessary to guarantee security and set them on a course to regulating their own affairs.
A recent study of Britain’s bloody withdrawal from Kabul in 1842 concluded that the first cause of the disaster had been the reluctance of junior officers to tell their superiors the truth about the dire situation the British forces found themselves in. I know from my own discussions with diplomats and Commanders in the field that such “happy talk” is not the order of the day now. Getting Afghanistan right means getting right down to ground truth. These are the facts as I see them.
- The Afghan people are tired of 30 years of war. They have been traumatised by the fighting and the denial of basic rights and opportunities. The majority of them hate, for good reason, the brutality of the Taliban.
- The Afghan government faces competing demands from its own people, and from the international community. But it lacks capacity. The concerns run deeper than elections marred by corruption. They also relate to the very structure of the political system.
- The Afghan insurgency is a broad but shallow coalition, with shifting relationships, geographical bases, and tactics. The Taliban are led by members of the former Talib regime under Mullah Omar who is now based in Pakistan’s border areas. But a variety of other factions are also operating, including the Haqqani network, Hizb-e Islami and a range of smaller groups. These groups all trade on the uncertainties of the people and the weaknesses of the state.
- The Taliban are still despised - recent polling suggests that only 6% want them back in power. But they do now have organised cadres which enjoy some, limited support - in the South, East and North – and are able to mount operations in Kabul and elsewhere.
- Having fled Afghanistan, Al Qaeda’s senior leadership is now also hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Its leaders have, in significant number, been killed or arrested. Despite the historical ties between Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban their relationship is predominantly tactical and local. Yet Al Qaeda retains the global capacity – including through its affiliates, such as that in Yemen - to plan and carry out deadly attacks.
- There has been a significant change in Pakistan in the last 18 months under President Zardari’s civilian government. The reality and threat of domestic terrorism has brought new purpose to civilian and military leadership, and new consensus between leaders and led. It is now realistic to talk of complementary pressure on the insurgencies on both sides of the border.
The Afghan and international strategy over the last eight years has been focused on building up key pillars of the state and delivering better lives for the Afghan people. There is a real record of achievement here, continuing today.
The return of five million refugees in recent years is perhaps the greatest sign of the growing Afghan confidence in their own safety and security, and an important indicator of our own progress in protecting the population. Polling shows however that insecurity is still the biggest problem. Last year more Afghan civilians were killed by the Taliban in insurgent attacks than ever before.
In 2003 the Afghan National Army numbered fewer than 2,000. Today it is over 100,000 strong, though the ethnic balance within it is weak. It will grow a third by the end of December, and further in the years to come. The Afghan soldiers are gaining frontline combat experience, including in the Moshtarak operation in Helmand Province. Plans are now being developed for the Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility to the Afghans – district by district and province by province – as the key conditions are met, starting this year. And as the Afghan National Army gets stronger, international forces will be able to withdraw from a combat role – although their support training and mentoring their Afghan counterparts will need to continue for a number of years.
In education and health the figures speak for themselves. In 2001, only one million Afghan children attended school, all of them boys. This year we expect to see seven million Afghan children in school– a third of them girls. Eight out of 10 Afghans now have access to healthcare. This year 40,000 more Afghan children will see their fifth birthdays than would have in 2002.
The National Solidarity Programme would be a remarkable story in any country. Almost 30,000 village councils have been elected by their peers. They have not just designed but implemented 40,000 development projects, and are now forming, from the bottom up, district councils.
There are areas where it is much harder to talk of progress, and where we are now rightly stepping up our efforts and where the Afghan government needs to do much more.
- Justice and law and order are a critical battleground. The Afghan National Police number almost 100,000. The biggest problem is now quality not quantity as the force is riven with drugs, illiteracy, patronage and corruption. The Afghan government is, rightly, launching a robust and far-reaching programme of reform. But they also need, with our help, to build up the informal judicial structures for criminal and civil dispute resolution. That is, after all, what Afghans often mean by the rule of law.
- Despite the success of the National Solidarity Programme, civil administration is a massively uphill struggle. In large parts of the country, district governance is almost non-existent; half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. Over the next two years the international community has promised to help train 12,000 sub-national civil servants.
- Last but not least, corruption. 95% of Afghans see corruption as a problem in their local area and in some regions the average Afghan is paying $100 in bribes every year. Such widespread abuse has deep roots. President Karzai has promised to take steps to end the culture of impunity, including by strengthening the High Office of Oversight to investigate and sanction corrupt officials. The international community will judge him by his actions not his words. Donors are trying to incentivise action here by promising to channel more aid through the government as certain tests are met.
The achievements of the last eight years are real. And none of them would have been possible were it not for the tireless efforts and unstinting bravery of our military. Without them, the insurgency would have overwhelmed the Afghan government and probably overrun Kabul. Our development work would have ground to a halt. And Al Qaeda would have seized more space to plan their terrorist atrocities.
The work ahead – on each of these fronts – is both clear and it is pressing. The additional troops that your country and mine are deploying are vital if progress is to be made. Britain’s commitment and determination will endure until we have achieved our shared goal – an Afghanistan that will not again be used as a base for international terrorism.
However, even on the most optimistic reading of present plans, only if the scale of the insurgency itself is reduced will the Afghan authorities be able to govern their land in sustainable or acceptable ways. And only then will we be able to withdraw our forces confident that we will not have to return. The efforts of our militaries are an important part of this. As General McChrystal said recently the role of the military is to “try to shape conditions which allow people to come to a truly equitable solution to how the Afghan people are governed”. This raises the core political challenge for Afghanistan, one which has been neglected for far too long.
The Bonn Agreement of 2001 and the process which followed it fell short of a sustainable political settlement. The Northern Alliance came to Bonn as the new masters of Afghanistan. But they were not representative of the broader Afghan population. It was right that the Taliban leaders were excluded from Bonn. But other, more significant and legitimate groups were seriously under represented, most notably the various Pashtun confederations from which the Taliban draws its strength.
The two Jirgas which followed Bonn led to a top down, highly centralised political structure for a country where the people have always had a strong predilection for managing their own affairs at local level.
Furthermore, the balance of formal and informal democratic institutions did not mesh with tribal and other informal, traditional and community-based structures. Corruption has exacerbated these problems. Resentment towards corrupt officials has eroded confidence in public office.
Finally, from Iran in the west to Pakistan in the east, the Central Asian Republics in the North, and the regional powers of India, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Turkey, the Bonn Agreement failed to bind the neighbours into the long-term project of building a new, more peaceful Afghanistan.
The lesson I draw from history is that Afghanistan will never achieve a sustainable peace unless many more Afghans are inside the political system, and the neighbours are onside with the political settlement.
Political Outreach
In respect of the insurgency, there is now international consensus behind a programme of reintegration, which the UN defines as “the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income”.
The logic behind this programme is simple. As military pressure on the insurgency increases - as the dangers of continuing the fight grow and the prospects of success look more remote – those on the periphery of the insurgency will start to review their allegiances. We have seen this across Helmand in recent months. Already in Marjah, the site of General McChrystal’s first big push to establish order, some fighters have agreed to lay down their weapons and accept the writ of the government.
For such realignments to be sustained there needs to be a serious alternative future for insurgents – not just employment but protection from retaliation by former allies. That is the significance of President Karzai’s proposed National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration, and of the $150m the international community has already pledged to fund it.
But my case today is that a reintegration programme will have major impact only if it is coupled with a serious effort to address the grievances of those whom President Karzai describes as his “disaffected compatriots”. Without a genuine effort to understand and ultimately address the wider concerns which fuel the insurgency, it will be hard to convince significant numbers of combatants that their interests will be better served by working with the government than by fighting against it.
Some insurgents are committed to Al Qaida’s violent extremist agenda. There will never be reconciliation with them – they must be beaten back. But the majority are not. They share conservative Islamic beliefs and, linked to that, strong views about what is a just social order. Their rallying cry is the expulsion of international forces. But they are also motivated by their intense dissatisfaction with the Afghan Government and Afghan politics – which they see as corrupt and incompetent.
The idea of political engagement with those who would directly or indirectly attack our troops is difficult. We have no more right to betray our own values than those of the Afghan people who pray that the Taliban never come back. But dialogue is not appeasement and political space is not the same as veto power or domination.
The Afghans must own, lead and drive such political engagement. It will be a slow, gradual process. But the insurgents will want to see international support. International engagement, for example under the auspices of the UN, may ultimately be required. So there needs to be clarity about the preconditions for any agreement: those who want a political say in their country’s future must permanently sever ties with Al Qaeda, give up their armed struggle, and accept the Afghan constitutional framework. In doing so their interests would be recognised and given a political voice but constrained by the laws of the land and balanced by the interests and views of others.
In his repeated offers to talk direct to insurgents, President Karzai has made clear that, whilst preconditions should set the terms of any eventual agreement, they should not prevent a dialogue from developing. The military build up of international and Afghan capacity concentrates the mind. Dialogue provides an alternative to fight or flight.
What might such a political settlement look like? An outsider can offer only suggestions. But the elements of a new political framework could include:
First, arrangements, formal or informal, to ensure that the legitimate tribal, ethnic and other groups that feel excluded from the post-Bonn political settlement, are given a real stake in the political process, and the ability to compete for political representation. A peace settlement must include the vanquished as well as the victors.
New arrangements for political organisation should give voice to the different blocs of opinion and influence. And efforts should be made to broaden the ethnic base of the Afghan National Army and other key institutions. All of this would encourage individuals to address their grievances, and those of their broader community, from within the system. The threat to the insurgency is of growing military pressure from increasingly numerous and capable Afghan and international forces. The offer is a political voice commensurate with support in the population and consistent with the Afghan constitution.
Second, the empowerment of provincial and district governors and their associated assemblies of elders, so that the walis (or provincial governors) and the uluswals (district governors) have the confidence, competence and capacity with which to govern in the best interests of those they represent. Recruiting the right people into these jobs is essential – and given the challenges in upholding justice and the rule of law the police chief and local magistrates are equally important. Local governors and local assemblies also need to be given more operational responsibility for development, dispute resolution, local security and local reintegration.
Third, a new dispensation – not necessarily involving constitutional change - between President and parliament, in which the legislature feels that it too has a real stake in the success of the enterprise. A stake that would encourage parliamentarians to construct as well as to criticise. And which would ultimately lead to the development of something completely alien in Afghanistan today, but critical to democracy – a constructive or loyal opposition.
And fourth, underpinning all this, must be a more concerted effort to prevent corruption. President Karzai’s promise to tackle the culture of impunity, and the establishment of a new anti- corruption unit are important. But the new political settlement needs to include many more checks and balances, and much greater emphasis on transparency and accountability to ensure that government at all levels and in all guises is the servant not the master of the Afghan people.
The great consultation proposed by President Karzai - the grand peace jirga – on 29 April should be the start of a process of building a new national political framework. The President has now spoken several times about his hopes for this gathering, which needs to be well prepared and bring together diverse representatives from across Afghanistan. It cannot solve every problem. It can set out the principles on which they will be addressed. We should support careful preparation, wide engagement and systematic follow-up, and encourage the President to play a leading role.
The External Political Settlement
A new internal political consensus would go a long way towards securing Afghanistan’s future stability. But no country’s politics can exist in a vacuum, least of all Afghanistan’s. For too long it has been the victim of external meddling and interference.
In 1898, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India called Afghanistan, “a piece on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for domination of the world”. The ‘Great Game’ and the Cold War are of course history. But even today, Afghanistan is a theatre in which competing regional interests are being pursued. And its tribal and ethnic groups – in the south, the east and the north – still roam freely across its borders. Those who oppose the government still draw on external funding, support and shelter.
So, if Afghanistan is to have a more peaceful and prosperous future, it needs not just a new internal political settlement but also a new external political settlement. There needs to be a greater effort to reach out not just to disaffected Afghans, but to the country’s neighbours and near neighbours.
Given the scale of the geopolitical challenges in this region – including the long-running tensions between India and Pakistan and the position of Iran – it can seem that Afghanistan is fated to remain the victim of a zero-sum scramble for power amongst hostile neighbours. The logic of this position is that Afghanistan will never achieve peace until the region’s most intractable problems are solved.
But there is an alternative, more promising story, in which Afghanistan is so dangerous for the region that it becomes the place where more cooperative regional relations are forged.
The first step is a greater recognition by all Afghanistan’s neighbours and the key regional powers of two simple facts. Fact one: no country in the region, let alone the international community, will again allow Afghanistan to be dominated, or used as a strategic asset, by a neighbouring state. Fact two: that the status quo in Afghanistan is damaging to all. Crime, drugs, terrorism, refugees spill across its borders when Afghanistan’s great mineral wealth and agricultural potential should be feeding the region. These two facts can and must provide the basis of a shared interest around which the countries of the region can coalesce.
Second – and this point is more complex - there needs to be a more honest acknowledgement of the different interests and concerns of the neighbours, so that efforts can be made to provide reassurances.
Pakistan is essential here. It holds many of the keys to security and dialogue. It clearly has to be a partner in finding solutions in Afghanistan.
Of course, Pakistan will only act according to its own sense of its national interest. That is only natural. Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan is close to the core of its national security interests. Pakistan fears the build up of a non-Pashtun Afghan National Army on their doorstep. It is perpetually worried about India’s relationship with Afghanistan.
Pakistan is a country of about 170 million people and growing fast. Its own security and economy has been directly damaged by decades of insecurity in Afghanistan. It is a nuclear power. It has had a difficult relationship with the US for a generation. That is the significance of the US Government’s determination to pursue a new security, economic and political relationship. This is a vital opportunity to address Pakistan’s concerns – and ours. The Kerry-Lugar Act is an important down payment in this regard.
But progress cannot be achieved simply by a more serious, more equal US-Pakistan strategic security understanding, crucial though that is.
If we are to recreate the post 9/11 regional consensus, there must be enough transparency to build confidence that every country’s legitimate interests will be respected, but that none will be privileged.
That means that alongside Pakistan’s own fears about its western border, fears about Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan need to be addressed. Every country needs to accept that, just as there will be no settlement in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s involvement, so there will no settlement in Afghanistan unless India, Russia, Turkey and China are also involved in the search for solutions. China is Afghanistan’s largest foreign investor and I will discuss the regional approach in Beijing next week. India has already pledged $1.2bn for reconstruction in Afghanistan. It has a big role to play. It means that the Iranian regime – which is flouting the UN on the nuclear file and has a track record in attempting to destabilise its neighbours – must acknowledge that the best way to protect its investments or promote the interests of Afghans that share its Shia faith is to work to promote peace not undermine it. Spurning the invitation to the London Conference was completely short-sighted.
Third, I warmly welcome the focus of Ambassador Holbrooke on agriculture and the success of wheat seed distribution programmes in turning farmers from poppy to licit production. Economics should also be the great lubricant for better regional relations. Afghanistan can benefit all its neighbours if it becomes the land bridge of Central Asia, South Asia and the Gulf. After all, the Silk Road was the passage for trade for many centuries. There are common interests not just in trade and transport, but in managing and sharing water and electricity and harnessing economic growth for the benefit of the region.
Fourth is the question of the forum in which this work should be taken forward. The process must be regionally owned. The Turkish Government’s meeting in Istanbul in January launched a new drive. The London Conference gave wider international approval. The Afghan government now needs to take the lead on regional engagement, in partnership with the UN. Only the region can decide whether the multitude of existing regional bodies can provide the basis for the serious and sustained engagement that is now needed; if not then a new standing Conference on Stability, Security and Cooperation in South Asia may be the answer.
Finally, and this is where the external settlement links most clearly to the internal political settlement, there needs to be greater transparency with respect to the future direction of Afghan foreign policy. It is for the Afghans to decide how to do this, but they too have a critical role to play in building confidence and reducing miscalculation. Linked to this, there will need to be consistency and clarity about the presence, activities and future plans of the international forces in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
I have been to Afghanistan six times as British Foreign Secretary. On my first visit in July 2007 I attended the funeral of its last king, Mohammed Zahir Shah. The grief I witnessed was palpable and deep, but so too was the sense of national unity. The unity is not expressed today through allegiance to a Monarch. Instead it is founded on a deep desire of the people to live life as they see fit. In that they are their country’s greatest resource – and ours.
The end state that we are striving for in Afghanistan is not utopian. Far from it. But within two to five years it is realistic to aspire to see a country on an upward trajectory, still poor but with a just peace, with democracy and inclusive politics bedding down at all levels and with incomes growing. The urban population should have access to electricity 24/7. More shops will be open in the local bazaars and more children - and in particular more girls - will be going to schools. Most grass roots insurgents –the so called ten dollar a day Taliban - should be resettled in their villages with at least some of the insurgent leaders reconciling into the legitimate political process. Communities will be increasingly able to rely on the Afghan National Security Forces for protection – or to protect themselves. International troops will have stepped back from the frontline to focus on the still dangerous work of training and mentoring. The neighbours will be working together, preventing trouble not fuelling it. And above all, Al Qaeda will be kept out.
This vision depends on sacrifice and money. But it is only feasible if politics comes to the fore. This is how the war in Afghanistan will be brought to an end.
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